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riting about secession is not an easy task for a 
political philosopher. It is significant that leading 
political philosophers of the past, from Plato to Marx 
and Hegel, did not pay any systematic attention to the issue 
secession.1 The absence of a theory of secession is even more 
remarkable if we consider traditional liberal theory, from Locke 
and Mill to Rawls. Though liberalism places great emphasis on 
values such as liberty and autonomy, and while some liberal 
scholars have elaborated interesting theories on the idea of civil 
disobedience and the right to rebellion, very little consideration 
has been given to the idea of secession within liberal political 
philosophy, at least until the last two decades.2 
Three main reasons might explain this gap in traditional 
political philosophy and, in particular, within liberalism. First, 
conceptually the notion of secession has a double dimension, 
namely a domestic and an international one and this complicates 
our ability subject it to a direct and straightforward analysis. As a 
domestic matter, secession is manifested in a refusal of the state’s 
 
1 Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,” Ethics 101 (1991): 322-42, 
at 323. 
2 Ibid., 324. See also Christopher H. Wellman, “The Morality of Secession,” in 
Don H. Doyle (ed.), Secession as International Phenomenon, From America’s Civil War 
to Contemporary Separatist Movements, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia 
Press, 2010), 19. 
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political authority by a portion of its citizens. From an 
international perspective, succession is conceived as a sort of 
right, itself derived from/dependent on a certain interpretation of 
the right to self-determination, which entitles a particular group 
of people, whether culturally defined or not, to separate from an 
established state.3 It is therefore not clear how claims linked to 
these two dimensions can be accommodated in one general 
theory. Second, a consistent part of liberal theory, in particular 
contractualism, has been concerned primarily with social unity 
and the stability of the political authority: an alleged right to 
secession would undermine the very basis of the consent on the 
common justification of the coercive power. Third, from an 
international perspective, both advocates of and those opposed to 
(a right of) secession tend to remain confined within the limits of 
either a statist or a nationalist paradigm. The traditional and 
entrenched doctrine of state sovereignty and territorial integrity is 
confronted with new nationalist or statist claims to territory.4 As a 
consequence, many attempts to theorize secession from an 
international point of view reflect and are constrained by this 
incapacity to overcome the statist paradigm.5 
Writing about secession in India raises further practical and 
theoretical problems. Under the provision of the Article 248(aa) 
of the Indian Constitution, in 1967 the Parliament passed the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which states that any action 
 
3 Margaret Moore, “The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of 
Nationalism,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence XIII (2000): 225-250; 
“On National Self-determination,” Political Studies XLV (1997): 900-913; 
Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-
Determination,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 142-171. 
4 C. H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination,” 
144. 
5 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 7. 
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or intention, including words “either spoken or written,” that may 
support a claim of secession is punishable with imprisonment.6 
Beyond these legal provisions, a major political concern in India 
today is whether it is possible to balance and accommodate the 
need for a shared political institutional framework with the 
necessity of giving voice and proper representation to the 
multiple sub-national communities that populate the country. As 
I have argued elsewhere, however, constitutional and legislative 
provisions on minorities have not prevented the emergence of 
new forms of religious fundamentalism, such as Hindutva or 
Islamic fundamentalism, and have not reduced the distance 
between local traditional communities and central state structures. 
In addition, violence makes this political impasse even more 
complex since in many regions—like in Kashmir—it easily 
translates into violent conflicts and ethnic cleansing.7 
The incredible task of professor Chandhoke’ new book, 
Contested Secessions, is thus to provide a restatement of a liberal 
theory of secession, understood as a remedial right theory, which is 
still compatible with situations of contested secessions, such as 
those occurring in many post-colonial societies and, in particular, 
in contemporary India.8 Chandhoke faces both these challenges 
with intellectual courage and great acumen. As a political 
philosopher with a liberal orientation, she re-conceptualizes a 
right to secession from the vantage point of post-colonial 
societies. From a theoretical point of view, this implies 
acknowledging the risks of two distinct forms of relativism, 
 
6 Patrick Hoening, “Contesting Secession,” Economic & Political Weekly XLVII 
(2012) 44-46, at 44. 
7 Valentina Gentile, “Secularism in Contemporary India,” in P. Losonczi and 
W. Van Herck (eds.), Secularism, Religion, and Politics: Concepts and Context in India 
and Europe (New Delhi: Routledge 2014). 
8 Neera Chandhoke, Contested Secessions. Rights, Self-determination, Democracy and 
Kashmir (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2012). 
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namely the post-colonial critique of “western-centrism,” on the 
one hand, and the liberal presumption of superiority of the West, 
on the other.9 Both forms of relativism fail to recognize that 
historical dissimilarities do not produce significant changes in the 
“conceptual framework of inquiry” that concerns justice.10 
Chandhoke therefore tracks a third way: she employs the idea of 
‘contextualization’ understood as an encounter between western 
theorizing about secession and the experience of post-colonial 
societies. In this respect, she argues that “theorists should search 
for cases that are especially challenging to his or her theoretical 
position […] to rework their assumptions and presuppositions 
and introduce greater complexity in arguments.”11 
The book starts by asking what sort of right is the “right to 
secede.” In responding to this, Chandhoke outlines three ways to 
justify this right, corresponding to three liberal approaches—
namely, national self-determination, consent and just cause.12 For 
her, only the just cause approach, and especially the version 
presented by Buchanan, satisfies the moral requirements of a 
right of this sort. Following Buchanan’s Remedial Right Theory, 
she believes that a right to secede can be justified only as a 
remedial right, that is, as a way to redress “institutionalized 
injustices.”13 However, the case of contested secessions shows 
that it is highly problematic to make this remedial right to 
secession an effective one, especially when weak democratic 
governments have to negotiate with secessionist groups, which 
are often illiberal and violent, and mixed to oppressed minorities. 
 
9 N. Chandhoke, Contested Secessions, 34. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 35. 
12 Ibid., 64-87. 
13 A. Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”; “Theories of Secession.” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1996): 31-61; Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination. 
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The case of India and Kashmir is for Chandhoke a plain 
example of this practical and theoretical deficiency in liberal 
theory. In India, disputes about secession are in fact characterized 
in three specific ways: first, although the state is a formal and 
legitimate democracy, it has subjected a group of people in 
Kashmir to institutionalized injustice; second, secessionist 
movements in this territory are often illiberal and their actions 
involve the use of violence; finally, any solution in Kashmir 
between the State and secessionist groups should not override the 
rights of other ethno-religious minorities settled in the same part 
of the territory.14 To disentangle this complex reality, Chandhoke 
seems to follow Buchanan’s strategy to “isolate and proliferate.”15 
She thus places great emphasis on possible ways to accommodate 
pluralism and guarantee a degree of autonomy within the 
democratic framework of post-colonial societies. 
Although Chandhoke is very influenced by Buchanan’s 
seminal work, her strategy seems to differ from his in some 
crucial aspects. In particular, Chandhoke does not seem to 
disregard the role of collective identities in enabling individual 
autonomy and, for this reason, an important section of her book 
is devoted to spelling out an account on pluralism’s intrinsic 
value. In the following sections, I will focus on two distinct yet 
related sections of Chandhoke’s theory: her distinctive version of 
remedial theory, and her emphasis on a form of comprehensive 
pluralist liberalism. I argue that this approach might result in 
inconsistency due to the conflicting demands of these two 
approaches. If we take seriously Chandhoke’s political claim in 
favor of the legitimacy of what she calls “formal” democracy, 
 
14 N. Chandhoke, Contested Secessions, 114. 
15 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 344. 
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further clarifications are needed with respect to the account of 
pluralism she proposes.16 
 
 
I 
Liberal Approaches to Secession: Mapping the Debate 
Two broad distinctions concerning the complex nexus of 
territory/self-determination/political legitimacy emerge in the 
contemporary literature on secession. Interconnections between 
these two give rise to three different normative approaches, 
namely: ascriptive/nationalist theories, associative/plebiscitary 
theories, and remedial right theories. (See, table 1). 
 
Nationalism Statism 
P
ri
m
ar
y 
R
ig
ht
 
Ascriptive and Nationalist theories 
(e.g., Moore) 
• National/cultural group has a 
legitimate political claim to its 
territory; 
• Collective autonomy; 
• Emphasis on National Self-
determination; 
• Ideal theory 
Associative and Plebiscitary theories 
(e.g., Wellman): 
• Legitimate states have a moral 
claim to territory; 
• Individual autonomy; 
• Emphasis on Political Self-
determination; 
• Ideal theory  
Ju
st
 C
au
se
 
 ‘Remedial right only’ theories 
(e.g., Buchanan) 
• Legitimate states have a moral 
claim to territory; 
• A group has the right to secede 
only if it has been subjected to 
systematic and enduring injustice. 
• Non-Ideal and institutional theory  
Table 1: Nexus territory/self-determination/political legitimacy 
 
16 N. Chandhoke, Contested Secessions, 90. 
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The first distinction is articulated across two axes, namely 
nationalism vis-à-vis statism. It corresponds to two different ways 
to respond to the question whether a group or association has a 
legitimate claim to its territory.17 According to nationalist theories, 
national or cultural groups that inhabit a certain portion of 
territory have a legitimate political claim to it. Statist approaches, 
instead, affirm that only a legitimate state has a moral and political 
claim to territory. 
The notion of self-determination introduces the second 
distinction wherein lies the philosophical justification for the 
alleged right of secession. Two different strategies, primary right 
and just cause, have been pursued to respond to the questions of 
whether and how the principle of self-determination interacts 
with both territory and legitimacy. A first group of theories 
affirms that a (moral) right to secede should be justified in the 
light of an extensive interpretation of the right of self-
determination, and therefore of autonomy (either collective or 
individual) of peoples or nations. In general, Ascriptive and 
Nationalist theories as well as Associative and Plebiscitary 
theories admit a strong presumption in favor of the liberal idea of 
freedom of political association.18 However, a major difference 
arises in respect to the notion of autonomy linked to this 
freedom.19 Ascriptive and Nationalist theories insist on an idea of 
collective autonomy. That is, communities, cultures or nations 
give a fundamental ethical content to individuals’ ways of life, 
which might naturally bring cultural/national groups to have a 
shared aspiration to constitute their own political unit, including a 
 
17 On this distinction see also C. H. Wellman, “The Morality of Secession.” 
18 See also A. Buchanan, “Theories of Secession,” 38. 
19 Margaret Moore, “The Ethics of Secession and Political mobilization in 
Quebec,” in Don H. Doyle (ed.), Secession as International Phenomenon, From 
America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements (Athens, Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press 2010). 
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legitimate claim to the territory where they live. For the second 
group, a right of self-determination of “politically viable groups 
within the territory”20 should be justified on the basis of the 
foundational value of individual autonomy.21 According to this 
assumption, the legitimacy of secession is assured if a “territorially 
concentrated majority expresses the desire to secede through a 
referendum or a plebiscite.”22 In this second case, it is the 
democratic procedure that gives legitimacy to secession rather 
than the ascriptive character of the seceding group.  
The second group of theories provides a more restrictive 
interpretation of the right to secede, understood as dependent on 
a ‘just cause.’ Supporters of this approach are generally wary of 
the incendiary potential that an extensive understanding of a 
general right of self-determination would have in destabilizing 
both national and international institutions, so they firmly ground 
the principle of self-determination in the commitment to protect 
basic human rights.23 It is therefore only when a state 
systematically fails in protecting the basic human rights of its 
citizens that a right to secession can be invoked as a last-resort 
‘remedial right.’ 
Buchanan’s remedial right only theory—perhaps, the best 
known of this group of theories—affirms that international law 
should recognize a ‘remedial right to secede,’ understood as a last-
resort response to serious injustice, but it should generally 
 
20 C. H. Wellman, “The Morality of Secession,” 22. 
21 M. Moore, “The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of 
Nationalism,” 232. 
22 Ibid. 
23 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 332. Buchanan argues 
that “a moral theory of international law should provide practical guidance for 
defusing the self-determination bomb, while […] giving legitimate interests in 
self-determination they due” (Ibid.). 
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encourage alternatives to secession.24 A distinctive aspect of this 
approach concerns the kind of theorizing it employs about the 
international system. Buchanan provides a nonideal institutional 
theory of international law, grounded on the principle of 
international legitimacy, meant to offer a “principled guidance for 
how to cope with the problems of noncompliance” in our real 
world.25 For Buchanan, primary right theories are different 
insofar as they are concerned with the morality of secession and, 
therefore, they offer an ideal (and not necessarily institutional) 
theory/mode of theorizing that provides a sense of how a theory 
of secession should look like under conditions of perfect 
compliance.26  
 
 
II 
Secession As a Remedial  Right . 
What Is New With Chandhoke’s Proposal? 
As I mentioned before, Chandhoke seems to agree with many 
of Buchanan’s conclusions. She shares Buchanan’s wariness of 
coupling the concepts of self-determination and secession, 
considering secession as an ultimate danger for autonomy. Like 
Buchanan, her suggestion is to increase the degree of internal 
autonomy of minority groups within existing territorial 
boundaries and argues 
instead of focusing on secession we perhaps need to think out alternatives 
to the nation state, how the aspirations of minorities can be best realized 
 
24 Ibid., 343. 
25 Ibid., 55. 
26 C.H. Wellman, “The Morality of Secession,” 28-39; A. Buchanan, “Theories 
of Secession,” 60-61. 
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within the state and how sovereignty can be diluted through political 
arrangements within the state.27 
Yet, unlike Buchanan, she does not renounce to provide an 
ideal (moral) theory of ‘substantive democracy’ that incorporates 
the notion of self-determination as its constitutive aspect.28 
Therefore, a distinctive feature of Chandhoke’ s theory is that she 
seems to move back from the nonideal institutional ground of 
Buchanan’s theory to another version of ideal theory. Such a 
theory would incorporate the right of self-determination into a 
broader moral, rather than political, conception of “substantive 
democracy.” For her then, secession is a weak right in 
democracies, which does not come into play as long as they can 
adequately respond to injustice, compensate victims, and 
accommodate pluralism. 
As I said, Buchanan’s theorizing is institutional (and to certain 
extent realistic) and considers the issue of secession from the 
perspective of those institutional tools already existing in the 
international legal framework, which are themselves evaluated in 
the light of a nonideal ‘moral theory of international law.’ Such a 
nonideal kind of theorizing presupposes the existence of both 
states, understood as fundamental political units of the 
international society, and an emerging international moral and 
legal framework. Thus, the condition of partial or non-
compliance that characterizes contemporary international society 
sensibly reduces the normative assumptions of the theory of 
secession, and compels us to rethink those legitimate institutional 
constrains that might balance competing claims. This approach 
considers both the domestic and the international dimensions of 
the problem of secession, and offers solutions which take into 
account not only seceding groups and parent states but also 
 
27 N. Chandhoke, Contested Secessions, 41. 
28 Ibid., 158. 
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international society as a whole, which is in various ways affected 
by these events.  
Chandhoke is engaged in quite a different enterprise. For her 
the problem of secession is primarily a domestic issue that should 
be accommodated within the framework of a pluralist liberal 
theory and this is particularly urgent in weak post-colonial 
democracies. Although she never refers clearly to the distinction 
between ideal and nonideal theory, her account of ‘substantive 
democracy’ seems to constitute an important part of a 
comprehensive theory of liberalism, one which incorporates a 
notion of value pluralism at its core. Chandhoke thus resists a 
right to secession because it would be inconsistent with such an 
account of value pluralism. Yet, this sort of ideal theorizing is 
quite different from that offered by supporters of Primary right 
theories. For while the latter are concerned with providing the 
ideal conditions for a moral right to secession in a context of full 
compliance, Chandhoke provides an ideal (moral) theory of 
liberal democracy that incorporates a notion of value pluralism. 
This sort of theorizing expects therefore that a denial of the right 
of secession is shared and endorsed by all citizens. 
 
 
III 
Ideal Theorizing and Comprehensive Pluralism: 
Some Theoretical Reflections on Chandhoke’s Approach 
If my reading of Chandhoke’s argument is correct, I may have 
unearthed a problem for her theory. Although she is aware of the 
discrepancy between the ideal conditions assumed by several 
liberal theories and the reality of most secessions, in particular 
those occurring in post-colonial democracies, her theory does not 
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significantly differ from other liberal theories in setting ideal 
conditions for the justification of principles of justice. However, 
in real world, not only national minorities or secessionist groups 
but also democracies are not perfectly just as her theory seems to 
assume. 
The major problem of ideal (moral) theorizing is the transition 
from ideal theory to nonideal circumstances that so often 
demands that we abandon many of our (idealized) assumptions, 
which reduces the substantive moral claims of the theory.29 This 
occurs because the ideal conditions of full compliance, necessary 
to the justification required by ideal theory, presupposes what 
Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, has called the “congruence” 
between the principles of justice recognized by the theory and the 
deep convictions of all members of the ideal “well ordered 
society” to whom these principles should apply.30 However, the 
assumption of (reasonable) pluralism causes us to reconsider the 
ideal conditions of the theory in favor of a non-comprehensive or 
“freestanding” conception of political authority, as Rawls puts it 
in his second book.31 
Chandhoke’s proposal goes in a different direction. She starts 
from a crucial distinction between empirical and normative 
pluralism. In defending a sort of intrinsic value of communities, 
she argues that we should move from an empirical or descriptive 
 
29 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. On this see also Laura 
Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of the Ideal Theory,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 17 (2009): 332-355. 
30 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press 
1971). 
31 John Ralws, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993). 
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understanding of pluralism to a normative one. Inspired by 
Berlin’s idea of value pluralism,32 Chandhoke argues that  
though pluralism is a value, it is a value with a difference. Like other 
normative concepts, such as equality, or freedom or justice it captures the 
desirability of a certain state of affairs. But unlike most other values, 
pluralism is a precondition for a plurality of values.”33 
These intuitions lead her to develop a comprehensive theory 
of liberalism based on value pluralism.  
In conclusion, I wish consider some of the weaknesses of 
Chandhoke’s normative proposal discussed so far. First, as with 
other cases of ideal theorizing, her theory of a ‘community 
sensitive’ liberal pluralism becomes problematic when we move 
to real circumstances. Chandhoke argues that in contexts where 
democratic governments are able to self-correct, secession can be 
rejected on the basis of moral considerations, e.g. protecting 
other minorities in the territory, contrasting illiberal and violent 
movements both in favor and against secession.34 However, when 
real cases of ‘formal’ (unjust) democracies dealing with both 
illiberal secessionists groups and other illiberal minorities are 
considered, the theory is in fact not able to offer a clear 
framework of moral prescriptions.  
This brings to my second consideration, related to her account 
of normative pluralism. My intuition is that Chandhoke’s very 
idea to develop a comprehensive pluralist liberalism is 
 
32 See Isaiah Berlin, Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
Chandhoke explicitly refers to Berlin in note 2 to the chapter, p. 155.  
33 N. Chandhoke, Contested Secessions, 130. 
34 Ibid., 212. 
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inconsistent with her value pluralism premises.35 This is evident 
when the theory postulates the extension of liberal toleration to 
both secessionist and minority groups, irrespective of the fact that 
they might refuse the fundamentals of liberalism. This situation 
produces two possible outcomes that I call unfeasibility and 
indeterminacy. First, if we assume that the commitment to value 
pluralism is dependent on the acceptance of some prior 
fundamental liberal values, the theory is unfeasible since any 
governmental attempt to address democratically secessionist and 
minority claims would find a strong resistance of non-liberal 
secessionist or minority groups. Second, if we assume that the 
commitment to value pluralism is independent of liberalism, the 
theory is indeterminate since it is not able to adjudicate disputes 
among liberal and other, even non-liberal, claims. 
Chandhoke is aware of the risk raised by this second account 
of value pluralism but, in the attempt to avoid the indeterminacy, 
she provides a comprehensive liberal theory that risks becoming 
inconsistently pluralist and, for this reason, unfeasible. The 
problem here is that her theory implies a strong commitment to 
some fundamental liberal values that inevitably have priority over 
nonliberal values.36 In my view, only an account of non-
comprehensive liberalism, like the one proposed by Rawls, is 
compatible with a thin or reasonable form of value pluralism.37 
Accepting this, when we move from ideal conditions to real 
circumstances of divided societies characterized by competing 
unreasonable claims, the pluralist premises of the theory should 
be interpreted in a narrow sense so that it becomes possible to 
 
35 On this argument see also Robert Talisse, “Can Value Pluralists be 
Comprehensive Liberals? Galston’s Liberal Pluralism,” Contemporary Political 
Theory 3 (2004): 127-139. 
36 Ibid., 136. 
37 John Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
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select those institutional and widely accepted political principles 
that actually set the limits of liberal toleration itself.38 
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38 I am indebted to Sebastiano Maffettone, Anne S. Hewitt and Domenico 
Melidoro for their evaluable comments to an earlier draft of this paper. 
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